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Aesthetic Judgements and Motivation 
Abstract: Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief-like states or non-cognitive, desire-
like states? There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the 
plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow 
heavily from Non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support 
metaethical Non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism. 
It is claimed that accepting this view, together with a plausible theory of motivation, 
pushes us towards accepting Non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for those 
wishing to defend Aesthetic Non-cognitivism, would be to appeal to a similar argument. 
However, both Caj Strandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstong have argued that 
Internalism is a less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral 
judgements by raising objections against Aesthetic Internalism. In this paper I will argue 
that both of these objections can be raised against Internalism about moral judgements 
as well. As a result, Internalism is no less plausible a claim to make about aesthetic 
judgements than about moral judgements. I will then show how a theory of Internalism 
about normative judgements in general is capable of avoiding both of these objections.  
Keywords: AESTHETICS; MOTIVATIONAL JUDGEMENT INTERNALISM; 
METAETHICS; AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT;  
Introduction 
Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief-like states or non-cognitive, desire-like states? 
In recent years a number of aestheticians, inspired by the debate between cognitivists and 
non-cognitivists about moral judgements, have attempted to provide answers to these 
questions (See Hopkins [2001]; Todd [2004] and McGonigal [2006]). These answers have 
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often been informed in interesting ways by the equivalent debates in metaethics1, and can 
be seen as part of the more general project of investigating whether theories about moral 
judgements can be plausibly applied to other normative judgements (see, for example, 
the following defences of epistemic Non-Cognitivism Gibbard (2003 p.227), Chrisman 
(2007) and Ridge (2007). The fact that aestheticians have looked to metaethicists for 
inspiration should come as no surprise, given that it is commonly suggested that aesthetic 
judgements and moral judgements share a similar structure (eg. Ayer [1936], Mackie 
[1977], McDowell [1983] and McNaughton [1988]). The focus of this paper will not be 
on whether Cognitivism or Non-cognitivism provides the more plausible theory of 
aesthetic judgements. Instead I will be investigating the related question of whether there 
is a necessary connection between aesthetic judgements and motivation. This question is 
importantly related to the previous one, as it is often claimed in metaethics that the 
existence of a necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation provides 
support for metaethical Non-cognitivism (eg. Shafer-Landau [2003 p.121], Hare [1952 
pp. 79 -93], and Stevenson [1937]).  
The possibility of a necessary connection between aesthetic judgements and motivation 
has been recently dismissed by both Caj Stranberg (2011) and Walter Sinnot-Armstrong 
(2010). Both Stranberg and Sinnot-Armstrong claim that it is much less plausible to think 
that a necessary connection exists between aesthetic judgements and motivation than to 
think that such a connection holds for moral judgements. If true this would provide us 
with good reason to think that there is an important difference between moral 																																																								
1 Todd (2004), for example, defends a view similar to Blackburn’s view (1998) about 
moral judgements. 
2 Although, for all this argument shows, moral judgements could include both cognitive 
and non-cognitive states. Such hybrid views are increasingly popular, see, for example, 
Ridge (2014) and Tresan (2006).  
3 This way of characterizing the appeal of Internalism comes from Strandberg (2012 
p.89).  
4 Smith (1994 p.61) restricts Internalism to rational agents. Dreier (1990 p.14) restricts 
Internalism to normal agents. Miller (2008) considers a form of Internalism restricted to 
virtuous agents.  
5 Miller makes this point convincingly about versions of Internalism that are restricted to 
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judgements and aesthetic judgements. In this paper I will respond to Strandberg and 
Sinnott-Armstrong by arguing that both objections can be raised against the existence of 
the necessary connection for moral judgements as well. As a result, neither claim gives us 
good reason to think that aesthetic judgements are different from moral judgements. I 
will then provide an account of the necessary connection between normative judgements 
and motivation that avoids these objections.  
1. Motivational Judgement Internalism in Metaethics 
Motivational Judgment Internalism, henceforth ‘Internalism’, in metaethics is the view 
that there is a necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation. This 
claim plays an important role in metaethical debates. The reason for this is that it seems 
possible to argue from Internalism and the dominant theory of motivation to the 
conclusion that moral judgements are non-cognitive states (Smith [1994]). The Humean 
Theory of Motivation states that beliefs by themselves are incapable of motivating. If we 
accept Internalism about moral judgements then we accept that motivation is necessarily 
connected to moral judgements and so according to the Humean view of motivation, 
they cannot be purely cognitive states.2   
Many have found Internalism to be an attractive theory of moral judgements because it 
provides an explanation for the strong connection that seems to exist between moral 
language and motivation.3 As many have observed, there seems to be something odd 
about someone who claims that an act is obligatory but fails to be motivated to perform 
it (those who make this claim include: Dancy [1993 p.4], Dreier [1990 pp.13-14], Smith 
[1994 p.60], Blackburn [1998 pp.48, 52-53] and Stevenson [1944 pp.16-17]). We can see 																																																								
2 Although, for all this argument shows, moral judgements could include both cognitive 
and non-cognitive states. Such hybrid views are increasingly popular, see, for example, 
Ridge (2014) and Tresan (2006).  
3 This way of characterizing the appeal of Internalism comes from Strandberg (2012 
p.89).  
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the plausibility of this claim by considering the following case given by Michael Smith 
(1994 p.6): 
Case 1: Jill and Jane are debating whether or not to donate money to famine relief. Jane 
says that they both ought to make a donation. A charity worker calls by, asking for 
donations and Jane refuses to donate. 
Jane’s behaviour seems puzzling in this case. We expect Jane’s moral judgement that she 
ought to donate money to motivate her to do so. Internalism provides a ready 
explanation for this intuition; the reason this case is puzzling is explained by the 
necessary connection that exists between moral judgements and motivation. 
 The other important argument in the debate supports externalism. This argument 
concerns the conceptual possibility of the amoralist, someone who makes sincere moral 
judgments but remains unmotivated by them. Externalists claim that such people are at 
least conceptually possible (eg. Svavarsdóttir [1999]). If we accept this then we seem 
forced to accept that there is no necessary connection between moral judgments and 
motivation. Internalists respond to the possibility of amoralists by weakening their claim. 
Either by claiming that the motivation need only be pro tanto or by restricting the claim 
to certain kinds of moral agents (rational, normal or virtuous).4 Of course, by doing so 
internalists run the risk of decreasing the significance of the theory for other metaethical 
debates. Certainly for some ways of restricting Internalism it seems reasonable to worry 
that what started as an interesting claim about moral judgements, has become a less 
interesting (for metaethicists at least) claim about certain kinds of moral agent.5 
																																																								
4 Smith (1994 p.61) restricts Internalism to rational agents. Dreier (1990 p.14) restricts 
Internalism to normal agents. Miller (2008) considers a form of Internalism restricted to 
virtuous agents.  
5 Miller makes this point convincingly about versions of Internalism that are restricted to 
virtuous agents. This, Miller points out, “Might be the case simply because of what it is 
to be a ‘virtuous agent’ in the first place,” (2008 p.252).  
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Nevertheless, my primary interest in this paper is not the implications of Internalism but 
whether it is a plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements. For the purposes of 
this paper I will be dealing with the following weak version of Internalism: 
Moral Motivational Judgement Internalism (Moral Internalism): For rational agents, there is a 
necessary connection between making a moral judgement and being motivated to act in 
line with that judgement.6  
In the remainder of this paper I will investigate whether a similar claim can be made 
about aesthetic judgements. As with moral judgements, the truth or falsity of Internalism 
about aesthetic judgements would have important consequences for the debate about the 
nature of these judgements. If Internalism about such judgements is plausible then this 
may provide support for non-cognitivists about aesthetic judgements.  
2. Aesthetic Motivational Judgement Internalism 
In this section I will look at what an aesthetic version of Internalism would look like.  
The first step in giving an account of Internalism about some type of judgement is to 
determine the actions that these judgements motivate us to perform. This is harder to do 
for aesthetic judgements than for moral judgements. A central class of moral judgements 
concerns the performance of certain kinds of action. When I judge that I morally ought 
to φ it is quite clear what action this judgement should motivate me to perform if 
internalism is true. Insofar as I am rational, this judgement should motivate me to φ. 
However, it is less clear what actions I might be motivated to perform when I judge a 
work of art to be beautiful. As this judgement is not about an action it is harder to see 
what action it might motivate me to perform. 
																																																								
6 This is similar to versions of internalism endorsed by Smith (1994) and Van Roojen 
(2010). 
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Nevertheless, as Strandberg (2011 p.53) points out, there does seem to be some kind of 
connection between aesthetic judgements and motivation. We assume that someone who 
recognises the aesthetic value of a work of art will be motivated to seek out similar works 
of art, at least so long as she is aesthetically competent. 
To see this consider the following case: 
Case 2: Alex says that The Ring Cycle possesses a very high degree of aesthetic value. 
However, Alex is never motivated to go to other operas by Wagner. Whenever one of 
Wagner’s operas is on in his town Alex goes to see the latest Hollywood blockbuster at 
the multiplex instead. 
There seems to be something puzzling about Alex’s behaviour, we want to say that Alex 
is being either irrational or lacking in aesthetic competence. The fact that this seems 
puzzling is instructive. There seems to be a reliable connection between judging a work 
of art to be aesthetically good and being motivated to seek out similar works of art. This 
reliable connection provides prima facie support for the existence of an internal 
connection between aesthetic judgements and motivation.  
While Strandberg considers only positive aesthetic judgements, the connection seems 
even more plausible when we consider negative aesthetic judgements. Consider the 
following case:  
Case 3: Rowena says that she judges the taste of mayonnaise to be aesthetically bad. Yet 
she regularly puts mayonnaise on her sandwiches and her chips.  
Rowena’s actions seem even more puzzling than Alex’s. Again we would want to say that 
she is behaving irrationally or that she is lacking in aesthetic competence. We want to say 
that if she really judges the taste of mayonnaise to be aesthetically negative then she 
would be motivated to avoid experiencing it.  
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We can formalise this form of Aesthetic Internalism in the following way: 
Aesthetic Motivational Judgement Internalism (Aesthetic Internalism): For rational and 
aesthetically competent agents, there is a necessary connection between judging an 
aesthetic experience positively and being motivated to seek out similar aesthetic 
experiences. There is also a necessary connection between judging an aesthetic 
experience negatively and being motivated to avoid similar experiences.7  
In this section I have looked at the form of Internalism about aesthetic judgements 
considered by both Strandberg. In the next section I will examine some criticisms that 
have been raised against the possibility of a necessary connection between aesthetic 
judgements and motivation. 
3. Challenges to Aesthetic Internalism 
In this section I will consider three reasons that support the claim that Aesthetic 
Internalism is less plausible than Moral Internalism. 
Despite suggesting the form of Aesthetic Internalism we looked at in the last section, 
Strandberg thinks there is good reason to think that this form Internalism is less 
plausible than Moral Internalism. Strandberg argues that the reliable connection that 
exists between aesthetic judgements and motivation seems much weaker than the 
corresponding connection for moral judgements. He supports this claim in the following 
way, 
																																																								
7 Strandberg restricts his discussion of aesthetic internalism to the link between aesthetic 
judgements of work of art and motivation. However, if we accept that our aesthetic 
judgements are not limited to aesthetic judgements of artworks then we have good 
reason to formulate this view without making specific reference to works of art. For the 
importance of aesthetic experiences that do not concern art works see Budd (2002) and 
Saito (2007). Thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful discussion here.  
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It is not difficult to imagine a person who recognizes that a work of art is 
aesthetically good, but is not motivated to look out for similar works as he has 
become tired of the kind of sensation they give him or for some other reason 
(2011 p.53).  
In other words, cases where the connection between judgements of aesthetic value and 
motivation break down are surprising and call for an explanation. However, cases where 
the equivalent connection breaks down for moral judgements seem far more surprising 
and have fewer acceptable explanations. While feeling tired or not being in the mood will 
serve as suitable explanations for not being motivated by aesthetic judgements, the same 
does not seem true for moral judgements. Strandberg’s point seems well supported by 
our intuitive reactions to Case 1 and Case 2. I take it most people would share the 
thought that while Alex’s behaviour is odd it is far less odd than Jane’s. Similarly, while 
tiredness can explain Alex’s lack of motivation to see an opera, it will not explain Jane’s 
refusal to donate money to charity. The reason that this weaker connection creates a 
problem for Aesthetic Internalism is that a considerable part of the appeal of Moral 
Internalism is derived from the reliable connection that exists between moral judgements 
and motivation. If we accept that the reliable connection to motivation is weaker for 
aesthetic judgements than for moral judgements then we should accept that the case in 
favour of Internalism for aesthetic judgements is also weaker.  
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong raises a similar challenge to Aesthetic Internalism. His 
objection is as follows: “(I)t is not clear why I cannot judge that a modern painting (or 
piece of music) has the positive aesthetic quality of being creative, even though I have no 
desire at all to see it (or hear it played),”(2010 p.65). The point Sinnott-Armstong is 
making is that we can make positive aesthetic judgements for which no explanation is 
needed for a lack of accompanying motivation. Although this point is similar to the 
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previous one, there is an important difference. Strandberg’s point was that the 
connection between aesthetic judgements and motivation is weak enough to be broken 
by tiredness or some other factor that would not be sufficient to break the connection 
with moral judgements. Sinnot-Armstrong, on the other hand, points to a positive 
aesthetic judgement for which there appears to be no need whatsoever to explain a lack 
of accompanying motivation. This point also seems well supported by our intuitions. We 
would find Alex’s behaviour much more understandable if he judged opera to be the 
most creative art form rather than the best. This is problematic for Aesthetic Internalism 
as it shows that it is possible to make a positive aesthetic judgement about a work of art 
and feel no motivation whatsoever to seek out similar art works.  
 
The final challenge that I will consider to Aesthetic Internalism is one that can be 
developed from observations made by Matthew Kieran to support a criticism of an 
entirely different claim made about aesthetic judgements. While attacking the view that 
aesthetic facts are determined by the tastes of ideal aesthetic appreciators Kieran claims 
that cultivating certain characteristics is essential for the enjoyment of certain aesthetic 
experiences (2008 p.278).8 Someone who has spent a lot of time and effort developing 
the right capacities to appreciate classical music may find it hard to appreciate disco. If 
we spend our time developing the appropriate character traits and responses for enjoying 
horror films we might find it hard to appreciate realist cinema.  
To link this back to the discussion of motivation we can imagine someone who used to 
have all of the appropriate character traits to appreciate horror films gradually becoming 
more and more interested in realist cinema. Perhaps she has begun spending time with 																																																								
8 The claim that aesthetic facts are determined by the tastes of ideal critics is a view that 
is often thought to found in David Hume (1963), although Stephanie Ross argues that 
this is not how Hume’s position should be understood (2008).  
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people who enjoy these films and this has allowed her to develop an appreciation for the 
slower pace of realist cinema. As she has developed these traits her capacity to appreciate 
horror films has deteriorated. She no longer gets the same enjoyment from horror films 
that she once did and as a result she is no longer motivated to watch these films. The 
reason this is important for our discussion is that we can imagine a person meeting this 
description who continues to judge horror films to possess great aesthetic value. If we 
accept that such a person is possible then we have a case of someone who judges that 
horror films are aesthetically valuable but feels no motivation whatsoever to watch any.  
4. Extending the Challenges to Moral Internalism 
In this section I will respond to the three problems for Aesthetic Internalism looked at in 
the last section. I will argue that while the three objections present major problems for 
the form of Aesthetic Internalism we have looked at up to now, they would equally apply 
to a similarly formulated version of Moral Internalism. These problems, then, do not 
show that Aesthetic Internalism is less plausible than Moral Internalism. The definition 
of Aesthetic Internalism given in §2 looked to aesthetic judgements that are not clearly 
connected with any specific action on the part of the appraiser. Recognising the aesthetic 
value of an artwork does not commit the appraiser to any specific act, though as we saw 
in §2, being left completely unmoved by such a judgement may seem odd. The claim I 
will make in this section is that, once we appreciate exactly what Moral Internalism is 
committed to, these objections can equally be raised against this view.  
To start, let’s note that Moral Internalism is a claim about all moral judgements. If this 
claim is true then we should expect all positive moral judgements to motivate us to act in 
line with them.  
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The first reason we looked at to think that Aesthetic Internalism is less plausible than 
Moral Internalism is that there are some aesthetic judgements for which a lack of 
motivation requires little explanation. Strandberg claims that this is the case with 
judgements of aesthetic value. A lack of accompanying motivation for such judgements 
can easily be explained by the agent being tired or not in the right mood. However, the 
same point can be made against Moral Internalism. We can judge an act to be morally 
good and require very little explanation for a lack of accompanying motivation. In fact 
the very same explanation that Strandberg considered in the aesthetic case will apply 
here. We can imagine someone who has spent ten years helping out at a soup kitchen 
and has become so tired of acting in this way that she has no motivation to carry on. 
There does not seem to be any reason to describe such a person as irrational. The crucial 
part of this objection is that the act is judged to be morally good rather than morally 
obligatory. This is important, as the claim that we might be unmotivated by a judgement 
that an act is morally good is much more plausible when we are clear that this not the 
same as judging the act to be morally obligatory. Similarly, there can be acts that I judge 
to be morally good that due to tiredness or not being in the right mood, I feel no 
motivation to perform.9  
Keeping in mind the separation of the good and the obligatory also allows us to respond 
to the second argument for the claim that Aesthetic Internalism is less plausible than 
Moral Internalism. The claim that there are some positive aesthetic judgements for which 
there is no need to explain the lack of an accompanying motivation will apply to moral 
judgements as well. Judging an act to be supererogatory (beyond the call of duty) seems 
to be just such a judgement. I take it that it’s a familiar feature of our everyday experience 
																																																								
9 Zangwill (2008) makes a similar point about moral judgements and tiredness without 
noticing the importance of the distinction between the morally good and the morally 
obligatory. 
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that we are not always motivated by these judgements, nor do we expect others to be.10 I 
judge that it would be supererogatory for me to stop working on this paper and go to 
help out at a soup kitchen. However, I have no motivation to do so and this strikes me 
as both perfectly normal and perfectly rational. There seems little need for someone to 
explain why she is not motivated to perform an act she judges to be supererogatory. A 
reasonable response to someone puzzled as to why an agent is unmotivated by a 
supererogation judgement is to point out that it was judged to be supererogatory not 
obligatory. Sinnott-Armstrong’s point that there are some aesthetic judgements for which 
there is no need to explain the lack of accompanying motivation applies equally to Moral 
Internalism. 
Perhaps, though, there is another way of understanding Sinnott-Armstrong’s point that 
presents a different problem. The example Sinnott-Armstrong gives, a judgement that a 
work of art is creative, is a thick aesthetic judgement. A thick judgement is one that 
contains both descriptive and evaluative elements.11 Perhaps, then, we might understand 
Sinnott-Armstong as pointing to a lack of connection between thick aesthetic 
judgements and motivation that does not apply to thick ethical judgements. However, 
this response does not withstand serious scrutiny, as thick ethical judgements do not 
clearly show a link to motivation either. For example, someone might judge that it would 
be courageous to volunteer to assist in the clearing of landmines but feel no motivation 
to do so. Such a person does not seem guilty of any form of irrationality.  
																																																								
10 For a full defence of the view that supererogation judgements are not necessarily 
connected to motivation see Archer (2016).  
11 Williams introduces the idea of thick ethical terms to describe terms such as ‘brave’ 
and ‘prudence’ that contain both evaluative and descriptive elements (1985 p.129). For a 
discussion of thick aesthetic concepts see Bonzon (2009).  
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To make the point more forceful, someone can judge an act to be courageous even 
though it is morally bad.12 We might think that suicide bombers display courage in giving 
up their lives for their cause while judging that their acts are overall morally bad. 
Someone who judged that it would take courage for her to become a suicide bomber but 
that it would be morally bad to do so would clearly not be irrational if she was 
completely unmotivated to become a suicide bomber. We can see, then, that Sinnott-
Armstrong’s criticism of Aesthetic Internalism also applies to thick moral judgements.  
A tempting line of response to both of these problems is to point out that Moral 
Internalism is only intended as a pro tanto claim. This means that positive moral 
judgements must motivate to some extent but that this motivation can be overridden by 
other concerns. This would allow the internalist to say that in order to be rational people 
must be motivated to some extent by a judgement that an act is supererogatory or 
courageous but that this motivation can be overridden. While this line of response is 
tempting it is not a plausible view of Internalism. To see why consider a case where 
someone is choosing between two permissible moral acts one of which is much better 
than the other. On this pro tanto form of Internalism the agent should be motivated to 
some extent to perform the less valuable option. This, though, is implausible. While it is 
possible that such an agent might be motivated to some extent by such a judgement 																																																								
12 We might object that if we accept the unity of the virtues, according to which the 
possessor of one virtue must possess them all (See Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1145 a1-
2), then we could not make such a judgement. However, not everyone accepts such a 
view, meaning that they, at least, could judge an act to be courageous and morally bad. 
Even those who accept some weak version of the view could make this judgement. For 
example, Susan Wolf supports the view that, “to have one virtue, one must have the 
knowledge required for the possession of the others,”(2007 p.161). Holding this view is 
perfectly compatible with judging that an act can be courageous and morally bad. Finally, 
while it may be the case that a supporter of the strongest form of the unity of the virtues 
(eg. Toner (2014)) could not judge an act to be courageous and morally bad, such a 
person should nevertheless accept my previous point that someone could judge the 
clearing of landmines to be courageous without being motivated to clear landmines. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful discussion here.  
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there seems nothing odd or incoherent about someone who made this judgement of the 
balance of reasons and had no motivation whatsoever to perform the less valuable act.13 
To see why consider the following case: 
Children vs. Donkeys: John has five pounds he has set aside to donate to a charity. He 
judges that he has some moral reason to donate it to a charity that cares for donkeys but 
much stronger reason to donate it to a charity that feeds starving children. He also judges 
that either act would be morally good but not morally required. 
In this case John judges he has some moral reason to perform one act but much greater 
reason to perform another. There seems no reason to think that it would be irrational for 
John to be completely unmotivated to donate his money to the donkey charity in this 
case.14  
Finally, the point that we might judge an aesthetic experience to be valuable but be 
unmotivated to perform it due to having developed traits that are unsuited to the 
appreciation of those experiences can also be transferred to moral judgements. It seems 
reasonable to think that focussing on developing the traits needed to be a war hero will 
be quite different from those needed to work in a soup kitchen. Just as developing a love 
of realist cinema might make me unsuited to appreciating horror films, developing the 
virtue of courage might make me unsuited to performing acts of charity. It seems 
perfectly reasonable to imagine a war hero who judges helping out at a soup kitchen to 
be a charitable act but has no motivation to act in this way. Again, the important point 
here is that these acts are judged to be good rather than obligatory. While it may be 
puzzling for a war hero to judge that helping out at a soup kitchen would be obligatory 
																																																								
13 Similar points are made by Dancy (2004 p.17), Wallace (2006 pp. 187-188) and 
Strandberg (2013 p.32). 
14 I have made this point before in Archer (2016 p. 609).  
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and be unmotivated by this judgement, the puzzle disappears when the case is altered so 
that the judgement is one of moral goodness or some other positive moral judgement. 
In this section, I have responded to three reasons to think that Aesthetic Internalism is a 
less plausible claim than Moral Internalism. I have argued that when we appreciate the 
range of moral evaluations that Moral Internalism applies to then these can be raised 
with equal force against this form of Internalism. There is no reason, then, to think that 
Aesthetic Internalism is less plausible than Moral Internalism.  
5.  Saving Motivational Judgement Internalism? 
In this section I will suggest a way in which both Aesthetic Internalism and Moral 
Internalism can be saved from the three objections I have considered so far. I will argue 
that restricting the claims to first person judgements about what there is most reason to 
do, all things considered, can save a limited form of both views.  
What the three objections considered in the last two sections amount to is that there are 
certain kinds of judgements we make in morality and aesthetics that are not clearly linked 
to motivation. Judgments about goodness and thick judgements are not necessarily 
accompanied by motivation, even among the rational. This should not surprise us. The 
reason that these judgements are not necessarily linked to motivation is not because they 
are aesthetic or moral judgements but because they are not sufficiently action guiding. 
Judging an act to be aesthetically or morally good may be accompanied by a judgement 
that these acts are bad in some other way. An act that is morally good may be 
prudentially bad. An act that is aesthetically good may be morally wrong. Similarly thick 
judgements and judgements about the virtues are also insufficiently action guiding to be 
necessarily linked to motivation.   
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What this tells us is that in order to find a plausible version of Motivational Internalism 
we must ask ourselves what kind of judgements will be necessarily connected to 
motivation among rational agents. The answer is that a rational agent will necessarily be 
motivated by a judgement that an act is what she has most reason, all things considered, 
to do.15 This form of Internalism concerns only all things considered normative 
judgements. It can be defined as follows: 
Normative Motivational Judgement Internalism (Normative Internalism): For rational agents, there 
is a necessary connection between first personal judgements about what there is, all 
things considered, most normative reason to do and motivation.16 
This form of internalism allows us to see why there seems to be a necessary connection 
between some aesthetic judgements and motivation. If I judge that I ought to paint my 
room blue rather than black and this judgement coincides with what I have all things 
considered most reason to do then I will necessarily be motivated to paint the room blue 
if I am rational. It also explains why the objections to both Aesthetic Internalism and 
Moral Internalism were successful. The criticisms presented us with cases where an agent 
is unmotivated by an aesthetic or moral judgement that is not also an all things 
considered normative judgement. This is perfectly compatible with Normative 
Internalism.  
If we accept Normative Internalism, then we should accept that Aesthetic Internalism 
and Moral Internalism are on a par with each other. Both kinds of judgement contribute 
to our all things considered judgement about what we ought to do and both will be 
necessarily connected to motivation whenever these judgements coincide with our 
																																																								
15 Wedgwood makes this point (2007 p.23-26). Sinnott-Armstrong also thinks that 
internalism should be restricted to all things considered practical judgements, though he 
denies that aesthetic judgements can ever be overall practical judgements (2010 p.65).  
16 This is similar to the form of Internalism given by Wedgwood (2007 p.25). 
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judgements about what we have most reason to do, all things considered. Of course, this 
is not quite the same as the form of Aesthetic Internalism considered in §2. There is no 
reason to think that Alex was making an all things considered judgement here. 
Nevertheless, it does point towards a way in which we might seek to explain the intuitive 
oddness of Alex’s judgement. We could explain this either by explaining how aesthetic 
judgements weigh into our all things considered normative judgements or by explaining 
why aesthetic assertions such as Alex’s convey an all things considered normative 
judgement pragmatically.  
It is important to note though, that in saying that Aesthetic Internalism is on a par with 
Moral Internalism, I am not saying that either form of Internalism is straightforwardly 
true. After all, the all things considered normative judgement that I am claiming is 
necessarily connected to motivation is not itself an aesthetic judgement or a moral 
judgement.17 Rather, it is a judgement about the balance of all of the normative reasons. 
We might take this to mean then that there is no necessary connection between moral or 
aesthetic judgements and motivation. After all, it is the all things considered judgement 
that is necessarily connected to motivation not the moral or the aesthetic judgement. 
However, there is an important sense in which both moral and aesthetic judgements are 
connected to motivation on this account. After all, both kinds of judgement contribute to 
our all things considered normative judgements. The all things considered judgement just 
is the judgement of the balance of our aesthetic and moral reasons, together with other 
normative reasons such as prudential or epistemic reasons. Moreover, whenever either 
kind of reason is unopposed by any reasons to the contrary then, insofar as we are 
rational, we will form an all things considered normative judgement in line with our 																																																								
17 As Bernard Williams points out, while moral considerations play a role in determining 
what there is most reason to do, the judgement that an act is what there is most reason to 
do need not be a moral judgement (1985 p.19). Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
pressing me on this point. 
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ethical or aesthetic judgement and be motivated to act accordingly. This allows us to 
endorse the following form of Internalism about aesthetic and moral judgements:  
Aesthetic/ Moral Internalism:  Necessarily, whenever an agent makes an aesthetic or moral 
judgement about how to act that she does not judge to be opposed by other stronger or 
equally weighty normative reasons, then she will be motivated to act accordingly.  
We might wonder whether this form of Internalism is able to explain why there seems to 
be a tighter connection to motivation for moral judgements than aesthetic judgements. 
However, there are several explanations that can be given for this. First, we might appeal 
to a view that is commonly accepted by moral philosophers. Moral Rationalism is the 
view that we always have most reason to act in line with our moral requirements.18 
Similarly, we might hold that moral reasons override other forms of normative reason.19 
If we accept either view then this will explain why Moral Internalism seems more 
plausible than Aesthetic Internalism. The reason it seems more plausible is that we will 
expect moral judgements to coincide with our all things considered judgements about 
what to do more often than aesthetic judgements do.20 Certainly when we consider a case 
where we have a clash between a moral reason and an aesthetic reason it seems 
reasonable to think that the moral reason should take priority (at least on most 
occasions).21 Take the following example, if someone is in a burning museum and is able 
to save either a Rembrandt painting or a museum guard it seems reasonable to think that 																																																								
18 Those who defend some version of this view include Portmore (2011), Smith (1994), 
and Van Roojen (2010). Both Smith and Van Roojen argue that Moral Internalism 
follows from Moral Rationalism.  
19 Those who defend some version of this view include Hare (1968), Stroud (1998) and 
Fairbanks (2012). This view is sometimes confused with Moral Rationalism. For a 
discussion of the difference between the two see Archer (2014). 
20 This seems right even if we accept the claim that aesthetic obligations exist. This claim 
is defended by Eaton (2008). Importantly though Eaton accepts that these obligations 
may be reducible to moral obligations or exist only when comparing two cases which are 
identical in all moral respects (2008 p.5-8).  
21 This point is made by Hampshire who claims that aesthetic considerations are trivial 
compared to moral reasons (1954 p.162).  
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the moral requirement to save the guard should override the aesthetic reasons in favour 
of saving the painting.22 Of course, as Van Roojen notes, Moral Rationalism might be 
true without everyone being aware of its truth. If this were the case then it might not be 
irrational for such an agent to be unmotivated by a moral judgement. However, as Van 
Roojen (2010 pp.518-521), argues, the meaning of the term ‘morally required’ is 
determined by the normal cases, those where the judgement that an action is right 
motivates the agent. This allows us to conclude that rational agents acting normally will 
be motivated by a judgement that an act is morally required. 
 
Likewise, we might think that the proportion of judgements that are first personal 
practical deliberation judgements is smaller in aesthetics than morality. In ethics a large 
proportion of the judgements that we make concern the assessment of behaviour, be it 
our own or that of others. We cannot escape the fact that many of the decisions that we 
make are open to ethical evaluation. In aesthetics, however, it seems plausible to think 
that the evaluation of behaviour plays a lesser role. Often we are concerned more with 
evaluating objects. Often these judgements have no clear practical upshot.23 Of course 
this may not be true for everyone. Things may be different if we approach this from the 
																																																								
22 This case is mentioned by Eaton (2008 p.4). It is worth noting that this is not the only 
way of interpreting the case. We might think that in so far as there are any requirements 
in this case, they are moral rather than aesthetic requirements and so this is a case of a clash 
between two moral requirements rather than an aesthetic and a moral requirement. This 
way of thinking is compatible with the point I am making that moral reasons seem to 
take priority over aesthetic reasons. After all, the best act from the aesthetic point of 
view still seems to be to save the painting rather than the guard. Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for helpful discussion here.  
23 Another way in which we might make this point is to say that, in comparison to 
morality, aesthetics is more concerned with valuations than deliberative judgements. In other 
words, aesthetics is more concerned with judgements about aesthetic goodness or value 
than aesthetic oughts or musts. I borrow this distinction from Wiggins (1987 p.95). In 
these terms, my point is that while aesthetics may be less concerned with oughts than 
morality that we do nevertheless make aesthetic practical judgements. Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for helpful discussion here. 
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point of view of the producer rather that the audience of art and music.24 When a painter 
makes a judgement as to the right colour for her to use or a jazz musician decides what is 
the right note to play it may seem more plausible to think that many of the aesthetic 
judgements being made will be first personnel practical ones. Even some aesthetic 
judgements made from the position of the audience might be directly action guiding. For 
example, if I am the judge of a competition for novelists then my judgement that I have 
most aesthetic reason to award it to Novel X rather than Novel Y will be a first personal 
judgement. 25 Such cases, though, are rare in comparison to our moral judgements. We 
are all of us the producers of acts that are open to ethical evaluation and criticism and, as 
a result, much of our ethical language and discourse is concerned with the evaluation of 
our own behaviour. If we accept Normative Internalism then this provides us with an 
additional explanation for the intuition that Moral Internalism is more plausible than 
Aesthetic Internalism. The reason that this is the case is that moral judgements are more 
likely to be concerned with what we have first personnel reason to do and it is these 
judgements that are necessarily connected to motivation. Even those unwilling to accept 
this claim might concede that aestheticians spend less of their time focusing on these 
judgements and this would be enough to explain the intuition.  
However, we should not assume that this means that aesthetic judgements will never be 
first-personal all things considered normative judgements. If, for example, I find out that 
a museum is planning to dispose of a work of art that I judge to be of greater aesthetic 
value than any other painting I know of and I can save it at absolutely no cost to myself 
or others then saving the painting is surely what I have most reason to do all things 
considered. The same point may well apply for the preservation of aesthetically valuable 																																																								
24 Thanks to Simon Frith for pointing out the importance of these different viewpoints. 
A similar point is made by Came (2012 p.166). 
25 Thanks to Cain Todd for pressing me on this point and Aaron Meskin for suggesting 
this example.  
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natural environments.26 In the same way, if an artist is trying to paint a beautiful painting 
and judges that, of all the available options, a certain brushstroke is the one that would 
be aesthetically best, then , all else being equal, she surely has most reason all things 
considered to make that brushstroke.  
It is important to note that these reasons to think that a higher proportion of our moral 
judgements might be of the kind that are necessarily connected to motivation do not give 
us any reason to think that Moral Internalism is true but Aesthetic Internalism is not. In 
terms of a necessary connection both kinds of judgement are equal, they will necessarily 
motivate rational people who do not judge them to be opposed by other stronger or 
equally weighty normative reasons. The difference then is one of degree rather than a 
difference in kind. This difference of degree does, though, explain why, at first look, the 
necessary connection appears more plausible for moral judgements. 
To sum up this section, the criticisms made of both Aesthetic and Moral Internalism 
enable us to see what is wrong with both forms of the view. Internalism is only a 
plausible claim about judgements concerning what we have all things considered most 
reason to do. Accepting this form of Internalism allows us to explain why Moral 
Internalism appears more plausible than Aesthetic Internalism.  
Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, in this paper I have responded to three reasons to think that Internalism is a 
less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. I 
have argued that the reason that both criticisms were successful is that they attack an 
implausible version of Aesthetic Internalism. When we define Moral Internalism in a 
similar way the same criticisms apply. As a result, these criticisms give us no reason to 
																																																								
26 Thanks to Rob Hopkins for helpful discussion here. 
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think that Aesthetic Internalism is less plausible than Moral Internalism. I then gave an 
account of Normative Internalism that can avoid both of these objections. On this 
account, moral and aesthetic judgements are connected to Internalism in exactly the 
same way; whenever these judgements are also first personal all things considered 
normative judgements they will motivate rational agents. However, there does seem to be 
reason to think that moral judgements might meet these criteria more often than 
aesthetic judgements.  
I started this paper by asking whether aesthetic judgements are cognitive or non-
cognitive states and set out to investigate whether an aesthetic non-cognitivist could 
appeal to Aesthetic Internalism in order to support her view. I have argued that there is a 
sense in which Internalism is true for aesthetic judgements, it is true for rational agents 
when such judgements are also first personal judgements about what there is most 
reason to do all things considered. However, it is far from clear that this version of 
Internalism is one that provides much support for the non-cognitivist, if any. After all, 
the cognitivist can argue that this restricted form of Internalism, if true, tell us something 
interesting about what it is to be a rational agent rather than anything interesting about 
aesthetic or moral judgements.27  
As I have already mentioned, the form of Internalism that I laid out in the final section 
of this paper does not explain why it seems strange for Alex to be unmotivated by his 
aesthetic judgement in Case 2. However, if there is a connection between this judgement 
and the all things considered normative judgement then this might explain why this case 
seems strange. Such a connection might be a necessary one or perhaps one that can be 																																																								
27 Similar points are made by Enoch (2011 p.251), Miller (2008 p.252) and Svavarsdóttir 
(1999 p.183) against forms of Moral Internalism restricted to rational agents. Given that 
Normative Internalism is restricted to both rational agents and to first personal 
judgements about what there is most reason, all things considered, to do it seems 
reasonable to think that the point is even more pertinent here. 
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explained by pragmatics. The investigation of whether there is any such connection and 
what kind of connection it might be is, to my mind at any rate, one that is worthy of 
further investigation.28 
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